The prerogative and its survival in Ireland: dusty antique or positively useful? by Cahillane, Laura
2010 The Prerogative and its Survival in Ireland 1 
 
 







Recently in Britain, there has been a discussion as to whether the Royal Prerogative 
is still a necessary part of the law. However, in Ireland, there is still confusion over 
whether the Prerogative actually exists in this jurisdiction. This is an issue which, if 
it had arisen during the debates on the Irish Free State Constitution, would have 
been irrevocably settled but it did not come up in 1922 and this has caused some 
controversy. This article examines the arguments for and against the survival of 
Prerogative in Ireland and the evidence in support of the various claims. The 
modern, seminal cases in which it was decided that Prerogative did not survive, and 
a more recent case in which the finality of the previous decisions was questioned, are 
first briefly examined. An examination of the various arguments in relation to 
Prerogative survival follows. Older cases from the 1920s and 1930s are then 
considered. Conclusions are drawn from the examination of the survival arguments 
and a solution proposed. Finally, the contemporary relevance of the Prerogative is 
considered.  
 
   
 
I – Introduction 
 
The question of survival of the Royal Prerogative in Ireland is one which has 
sparked criticism of the Irish Supreme Court and has recently caused more or less open 
disagreements among Supreme Court judges and academic commentators. The Supreme 
Court held, in two important constitutional cases, Byrne v. Ireland1 and Webb v. Ireland2 
that the Prerogative did not survive the creation of the Irish Free State, using reasoning 
which has been strongly condemned by academics such as Niall Lenihan,3 Kevin 
Costello4 and Professor Kelly,5 who criticised the judgments of the Supreme Court and 
argued that the Prerogative was, in fact, alive and well during the Free State years. 
                                                 
*  BCL (Law and French) 2007, LLM (2008), PhD Candidate (UCC). I wish to thank Professor David 
Gwynn Morgan for his invaluable assistance and advice. Naturally, the responsibility for the views 
expressed is entirely mine. I also wish to acknowledge the support of the Irish Research Council for the 
Humanities and Social Sciences. 
 
1 [1972] I.R. 241 [hereinafter Byrne]. 
2 [1988] 1 I.R. 353, [1988] I.L.R.M. 565 [hereinafter Webb]. 
3 N. Lenihan, “Royal Prerogatives and the Constitution” (1989) 24 Irish Jurist 1 [hereinafter Lenihan]. 
4 K. Costello, “The Expulsion of Prerogative Doctrine from Irish Law: Quantifying and Remedying the 
Loss of the Royal Prerogatives” (1997) 32 Irish Jurist 145 [hereinafter Costello].  
5 J.M. Kelly, “Hidden Treasure and the Constitution” (1988) 10 D.U.L.J. 5 [hereinafter Kelly]. 
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More recently, in Geoghegan v. Institute of Chartered Accountants,6 the Supreme Court 
questioned its previous decisions on Prerogative. However, while the Supreme Court 
may not originally have been entirely correct, it seems that the alternative view can also 
be challenged. This is not only a fascinating historical question, but also, as will be 
shown later, of some practical contemporary significance.  
 
It is proposed here to examine the arguments for and against the survival of 
Prerogative in Ireland and to consider the evidence in support of the various claims. 
The modern, seminal cases of Byrne7 and Webb,8 in which it was decided that 
Prerogative did not survive, and Geoghegan,9 in which the finality of the previous 
decisions was questioned, will first be briefly examined in Part II.10 Part III will involve 
an examination of the various arguments in relation to Prerogative survival. Older cases 
from the 1920s and 1930s will also be considered in this part. In Part IV, conclusions 
will be drawn from the examination in Part III and a solution proposed. Finally, Part V 
considers the contemporary relevance of the Prerogative. 
 
II – Modern Case Law 
 
In Byrne the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the State could 
benefit from the Crown‟s prerogative power of immunity from suit.11 Walsh J, who gave 
judgment for the majority of the Court, in a surprising judgment, held that because the 
Irish Constitutions stated that all authority came from the people, Prerogative could not 
apply in this State. He reasoned that the basis of Prerogative was that all authority came 
from the Crown and the Crown was the personification of the state. However, Walsh J. 
cited Article 2 of the Free State Constitution and deduced that the people, not the 
Crown, were the personification of the Irish Free State, and this meant that all royal 
prerogatives ceased to exist in Ireland with the enactment of the Irish Free State 
                                                 
6 [1995] 3 I.R. 86 [hereinafter Geoghegan]. 
7 Byrne, supra note 1. 
8 Webb, supra note 2. 
9 Geoghegan, supra note 6. 
10 As these cases have been examined numerous times, it is not proposed to enter into any detailed 
examination of them. 
11 Byrne, supra note 1. 
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Constitution.12 This was the first case in which such a definitive statement on 
Prerogative had been made. 
 
Two other judges in the case, O‟Dálaigh C.J. and O‟Keeffe P. agreed with Justice 
Walsh. Budd J. gave a separate 20-page judgment in which he gave detailed 
consideration to the question of sovereignty and what that meant as regards immunity 
for the state. He eventually stated that he agreed with the reasoning and conclusions of 
Walsh J. He also stated:  
[t]he very nature of the State as exemplified in the wording of the 
provisions of the Constitution would seem, speaking generally, to be such 
that old feudal conceptions are irreconcilable with it. The King is completely 
absent from the Constitution and gone with him is any idea of the King as 
the personification of the State; I can find no suggestion in the Constitution 
of anything in the nature of perfection in the State.13 
 
However, Fitzgerald J., in a very short one page judgment, dissented on the basis that 
the majority judgment constituted a radical change in the law.14 
 
Interestingly, it was Murnaghan J. who had heard the case in the High Court. 
Although he was one of the original members of the Constitution Committee which, 
fifty years before, drafted the Irish Free State Constitution, he failed to discuss the 
survival of Prerogative point. Instead he rejected the plaintiff‟s claim on the basis of 
sovereignty: “the simple statement that „Ireland is a sovereign ... state‟ is completely 
inconsistent with the propositions that the State is subject to one of the organs of State, 
the judicial organ, and can be sued as such in its own courts.”15 He used sovereignty to 
come to a completely different conclusion from the one eventually arrived at in Webb. 
Murnaghan J. decided that it is because the State is sovereign that it cannot be subject 
to one of its organs, namely the courts, and so it cannot be sued. However, if this point 
is teased out further, the reasoning starts to unravel; Murnaghan J. says the State is 
sovereign, but it is only sovereign because the people are sovereign. He assumed that 
                                                 
12 Ibid. at 272. 
13 Ibid. at 298.  
14 Ibid. at 310-311.  
15 Ibid. at 255.  
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the State had replaced the Crown in the UK, where the people do not feature.  This 
reasoning was held to be defective in the Supreme Court.16  
 
In the second case, Webb,17 the Supreme Court confirmed the Supreme Court‟s 
judgment in Byrne, in holding that the prerogative of Treasure Trove did not exist in 
Ireland as it was part of the Royal Prerogative which had been destroyed with the 
enactment of the Irish Free State.18 Finlay C.J., giving judgment for the court, stated 
that he agreed with the judgment in Byrne and held that “no royal prerogative in 
existence prior to the enactment of the Constitution of 1922 was by virtue of the 
provisions of that Constitution vested in the Irish Free State.”19 
 
A few years later in Geoghegan,20 which is the most modern case on the 
Prerogative, the question appeared to be re-opened. Although the point was obiter since 
the case did not centre on the question of survival of the Prerogative,21 Byrne and Webb 
were followed in that it was held that no Royal Prerogatives had vested in the Irish 
                                                 
16 Walsh J. stated:  
[i]n the first place I think that the learned trial judge misconstrued the intent of Article 5 if he 
construed it as a constitutional declaration that the State is above the law. Article 1 of the 
Constitution affirms that the Irish nation has the „sovereign right to choose its own form of 
Government‟. Our constitutional history, and in particular the events leading up to the 
enactment of the Constitution, indicate beyond doubt, to my mind, that the declaration as to 
sovereignty in Article 5 means that the State is not subject to any power of government save 
those designated by the People in the Constitution itself, and that the State is not amenable to 
any external authority for its conduct. To hold that the State is immune from suit for wrong 
because it is a sovereign state is to beg the question. 
Byrne, supra note 1 at 264. 
17 Geoghegan, supra note 6.  
18 However, because of this, the Court was driven to the very spurious conclusion that the same right 
involved in Treasure Trove (the right to acquire items, such as gold coins, which are discovered and have 
no known owner), did actually exist in Ireland. The reason the State could claim the find was not because 
of prerogative but because of the fact that by Art. 5, Ireland was a sovereign State. The Court held that 
because heritage is such a fundamental facet to the sovereignty of a State, as a consequence, the State 
should be entitled to items of historical importance where the owner cannot be identified. 
19 Webb, supra note 2 at 382. Henchy and Griffin JJ. agreed with the Chief Justice. Walsh and McCarthy 
JJ. gave separate judgments but also agreed on this point. 
20 Geoghegan, supra note 6.  
21 This case related to an Institute which was established by prerogative power prior to 1922 and the 
question raised was whether this and other such bodies had survived the enactment of the 1922 
Constitution. It was held that although the Royal prerogative had not survived, there was no reason that 
bodies which had been established before Independence could not have continued to exist under the 1922 
Constitution. 
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Free State.  O‟Flaherty J. endorsed the views of Murphy J. in the High Court, 22 who 
had drawn a distinction between the content and source of the Prerogative,23 and then 
went on to cast doubt on the Byrne-Webb line of authority by making the following 
remark:  
 
[a]s regards the decisions in Byrne v. Ireland and Webb v. Ireland, since each 
was concerned with a single question in respect of the royal prerogative 
(whether the State was immune from civil suit in the one case and the State's 
entitlement to treasure trove in the other), it may be that if in a future case a 
wider question is raised concerning the royal prerogative, the parameters of 
the judgments in these cases may need to be delineated.24 
 
By this comment, the decision in Byrne was called into question once again.  
 
 III – Arguments on Survival of Prerogative 
 
Various different arguments were put forward in support of the view that the 
Prerogative actually had survived and additional arguments can be put forward based 
on judgments from the 1920s. The arguments in favour of survival can be summarised 
as follows: 
A. Prerogative must have survived because everyone in the 1920s thought it did; 
B. Prerogative survived because of obligation to follow Canadian precedent; 
C. Prerogative survived because specific prerogative powers are provided for in the 
1922 Constitution; 
D. Prerogative survived because the entire corpus of Prerogative was carried over 
by various Articles in the 1922 Constitution; or 
E. Prerogative must have survived because otherwise, Article 49 of the 1937 
Constitution is pointless. 
It is now proposed to examine the merits of each of these arguments. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Hamilton C.J, Denham and Egan JJ. do not mention Murphy J.‟s finding but Blayney J. states that he 
agrees with O‟Flaherty J. 
23 This will be discussed infra at Part IV.  
24 Geoghegan, supra note 6 at 118. 
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A. Prerogative must have survived: Prerogative in practice 
 
Professor Kelly made a statement in his article on the Prerogative in the Dublin 
University Law Journal, which has now become rather famous: 
 I think that for us today, 50 or 60 years later, to take the line that our 
fathers and grandfathers in legal, political and official life quite 
misunderstood the nature of the machine they were not only operating but 
had in fact constructed, is to adopt an unreal and intellectually unamiable 
position.25  
 
Kelly argued that the Crown and its Prerogative were understood to have survived the 
enactment of the Irish Free State Constitution and that this much is clear from the 
practice of the time.26 This is a rather strange argument, akin to stating that because 
everyone assumes the law is a certain way then it must be. Nevertheless, it has its 
analogues, for instance adverse possession in property law. Of course there is a lot of 
doubt here but with any under-developed question of law the evidence of legal and 
scholarly opinion must be taken into account. In fact, in the much maligned Byrne case, 
Fitzgerald J. dissented on the basis that he believed the majority judgment constituted a 
radical change in the law.27 
 
Returning then to the principal question, which is whether the Prerogative 
actually did survive, it will be useful to consider the contemporary opinion. In Kohn‟s 
comprehensive work on the Free State Constitution, written during the late 1920s and 
published in 1932, he discusses the sovereignty of the people. He points out that “the 
constitutional significance of the insertion ... of a formal declaration that „all powers of 
government and all authority legislative, executive and judicial in Ireland are derived 
from the people of Ireland‟ need hardly be laboured.”28 He also remarks that because it 
was one of the provisions on which the British agreed, that is confirmation of British 
                                                 
25 Kelly, supra note 5 at 14-15.  
26 Kelly instances the right to pardon, the existence of King‟s Counsel and the issuing of passports as 
examples of prerogative powers in practice. However, the second example is hardly a prerogative and the 
granting of passports could be argued to be implicit in the powers of the State. Furthermore the power to 
grant pardon was exercisable by the Governor General and as such, could come under the category of 
prerogative powers provided for in the 1922 Constitution. Ibid. at 15. For discussion on this point see 
infra  p 12. 
27 Byrne, supra note 1 at 310-311. 
28 L. Kohn, The Constitution of the Irish Free State (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1932) at 113 
[hereinafter Kohn]. 
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recognition of Irish sovereignty. He notes the republican leitmotif which runs 
throughout the whole Constitution and remarks that while the “monarchical head” had 
to be included, it had been done so as “a functionary of the Irish people ... almost as the 
permanent President of an Irish Republic”.29 Kohn then goes on to make a very strong 
statement: “[t]here is a King; there is no Royal Prerogative.”30 He bases this assertion 
on the existence of what he terms “the fundamental declaration of the sovereignty of the 
people” which is contained in the 1922 Constitution. It is difficult to reconcile this view 
with that of Kelly.31  
 
In his judgment on the Byrne case, Walsh J. dealt with this argument when he 
pointed out the following: 
 [c]onfusion was increased by the fact that the King enjoyed some place 
under the Constitution of the Irish Free State, 1922, and by the fact that in 
these years the law was practised and interpreted by persons who, quite 
naturally, had been mostly orientated by education and practice towards a 
system in which this concept of sovereign immunity of the Crown held 
sway.32 
 
In other, less polite words, he believed that the people of the time were wrong. 
However, Walsh J. has a fair point and the same point has been used as a reason for the 
failure of judicial review under the Irish Free State Constitution.33 The bottom line is 
that Irish lawyers and judges had all trained in the British tradition, thus it is likely that 
it would be a long time before the aspects of the new legal system were properly 
understood.34  
                                                 
29 Ibid. at 114. 
30 Ibid.  
31 And with other opinions which will be discussed infra at 25.   
32  Byrne, supra note 1 at 269. 
33 See V.T.H. Delaney, “The Constitution of Ireland: Its Origins and Development” (1957) 12 University 
of Toronto Law Journal 1 at 9-10. He submits that because the lawyers of the time were steeped in the 
tradition of parliamentary sovereignty they never quite got to grips with the idea that the Courts could 
review actions of the legislature. As with Walsh J.‟s point, both assert that the older tradition was so 
inherent in the minds of the people at the time that they simply followed it without reference to the new 
legal order. 
34 Another interesting fact is that Article 42 of Draft B of the 1922 Constitution contained the following 
clause: “Proceedings may be instituted against Saorstát Éireann in such manner and subject to such 
regulations as may be prescribed by law.” This provision was eventually dropped at some stage without 
discussion and it was never included in the eventual document of 1922. It is possible that the Government 
did not like the idea of the Article and decided to leave the question open but it is also possible that they 
felt that is was simply unnecessary to state in the 1922 Constitution as it was obvious that proceedings 
could be instituted. However, there is no proof either way as to why the provision was dropped.  




B. Prerogative survived because of obligation to follow Canadian precedent 
 
This argument is propounded by Lenihan, who has noted what he believes to be 
the major defect in the Byrne case: 
 [i]t fails to consider the provisions of the Constitution of the Irish Free 
State Act 1922... [and the] Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between 
Great Britain and Ireland, 1921 ... [which provide] that the law, practice 
and constitutional usage governing the relationship of the Crown to the 
dominion of Canada shall govern its relationship to the Irish Free State.35  
 
As a result of this obligation to follow Canada, Lenihan opines that consequentially, 
even “Article 2 of the Saorstát Constitution is contrary to the Articles of Agreement in 
so far as it declares all powers of government to be derived from the people rather than 
the Crown, and is to the extent of such conflict absolutely void and inoperative.”36 But 
this reasoning assumes that according to the Treaty, Ireland was to follow all of the 
constitutional precedents of Canada. However, the Irish Free State departed 
significantly from Canadian legal practice and theory in many instances.  
 
The most obvious difference is that the personification of the Dominion of 
Canada was the Crown but in Ireland, as detailed earlier,37 it was the people. This was 
because under the Irish 1922 Constitution it was the people who were sovereign.38 This 
constitutes a major departure from Canadian precedent. The form of oath was another 
departure: the oath to be taken by Irish deputies on entering parliament was less 
consequential than the Canadian oath.39 Kohn has written in relation to the Irish oath 
that: 
                                                 
35 Lenihan, supra note 3 at 3.  
36 Ibid. at 4.  
37 Supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
38 This was the defect in the reasoning of Murnaghan J. in the High Court in Byrne, supra note 1, 
considered ibid.  
39 The Canadian oath (which can be found in the 5th Schedule to the British North America Act 1867) read 
“I A.B. do swear, that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Victoria,” whereas 
the Irish deputies had to swear:  
I AB do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by 
law established, and that I will be faithful to HM King George V, his heirs and successors by law 
in virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to and 
membership of the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations. 
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[a]llegiance is pledged exclusively to the Constitution of the Irish Free 
State, in which the King, in so far as he forms part of that constitutional 
structure, derives his authority not from any inherent prerogative, but from 
the sovereign will of the Irish people ... . It is from the allegiance to the Irish 
citizen to his own State that the declaration of faithfulness to the King as 
head of the British Commonwealth of Nations is derived.40 
 
Furthermore, Professor Keith wrote that the new form of oath “emphasised that the 
fidelity and allegiance of the Members of the Parliament of the Free State are primarily 
to the Constitution of the State and only secondarily to the Crown.”41 In addition, the 
Canadian Parliament did not have the power to amend its Constitution. Neither did it 
have the power of dissolution or assembly.42 The Crown preserved the power of 
disallowance in Canada, whereas it was excluded from the Irish 1922 Constitution. In 
Canada the Governor-General had some discretion in relation to dissolution but Ireland 
he had no such power.43 Even in regard to the appeal to the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council, in Canada this was possible both as of right and by special leave whereas 
in Ireland it was only permitted where special leave was obtained.  
 
So, following the line of reasoning that Ireland had to conform to all the 
Canadian precedents would have led to the absurd conclusion that Ireland was in 
complete violation of the Treaty. Now it is true that many of these instances where 
Ireland had departed from Canadian precedent were contained in provisions which had 
been agreed to by the British when the Draft Constitution was brought over to London. 
Because of this, it could be argued that the British gave their consent to many of the 
departures from Canadian precedent and therefore perhaps it follows that Canadian 
practice was to be followed apart from the agreed exceptions. 
 
However, the fact is that some exceptions developed in practice and without any 
express British agreement. In these situations, the Irish neither followed Canadian 
practice nor obtained British consent for this failure, and nobody objected. One such 
                                                                                                                                                 
This form of oath was specified by Article 4 of the Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921.  
40 Kohn, supra note 28 at 53. 
41 IV Journal of Comparative Legislation 105, as cited by Kohn, ibid.  at p 54. 
42 Article 50 provided for the power of amendment of the Constitution of the Irish Free State. Articles 24, 
28 and 53 provide for convocation and dissolution of the Oireachtas. 
43 The Governor General is specifically deprived of this power under Art. 53.  
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example is the Governor-General situation where Ireland was constantly striving to 
achieve more than the Canadian position.44 Another example is the unilateral abolition 
of the Appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.45 There are many more 
examples such as the creation of Irish citizenship46 and Irish passports,47 and the 
practice of sending diplomatic representatives to other countries.48 Perhaps it is not 
going too far to argue that the Irish Free State was slowly shedding its acquired skin of 
Canadian law and practice for something more original while the British stood by and 
watched.  Lenihan concludes his point on abrogation of the Treaty with the following 
comment: “[t]he Articles provided that the relationship between the Crown and the 
dominion of Canada govern the Crown‟s relationship to the Saorstát, and that is the end 
of the matter.  ... If prerogative powers were exercisable in the dominion of Canada in 
1922, then they were also exercisable in the Saorstát”.49 But in reality, as the examples 
given above show, this was not the case. 
 
However, that is not to say that there was no support for the use of Canadian 
precedent in this respect. In Galway County Council v. Minister for Finance and the 
Attorney-General,50 Johnston J. dealt what he called “prerogative right” when he held 
that the Minister for Finance was entitled to rely on the prerogative whereby there 
being no indication in the legislation that it was the intention of the Legislature to bind 
the Crown or the State, the State could not be bound. He commented that: “[t]here can 
be no doubt, and it has not been argued in the present case to the contrary, that the 
                                                 
44 Ireland was the first Dominion to appoint one of its own citizens to the post. Once the precedent had 
been established in the appointment of T.M. Healy, the Irish Government regarded it as a right. See D.R. 
Gwynn Morgan, The Irish Free State 1922-1927 (London: Macmillan & Co., 1928) at ch V.  
45 The appeal was abolished unilaterally by the Constitution (Amendment No. 22) Act 1933, which was 
retrospectively validated by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council itself in Moore v. Attorney General 
[1935] A.C. 484. See T. Mohr, “Law without loyalty – the abolition of the Irish appeal to the Privy 
Council” (2002) 37 I.J. 187. 
46 The idea of a distinctive Irish citizenship was another novel departure, for although certain types of 
Dominion nationality had been created, no other Dominion had conceived a truly national citizenship. 
Canada had created a Canadian nationality but only with regard to re-immigration into the jurisdiction 
and also in relation to the appointment of Canadian members to the Court of International Justice. See C. 
Parry, Nationality and Citizenship Laws of the Commonwealth and of the Republic of Ireland (London: Stevens 
& Sons Ltd., 1957) at 450-451.  
47 This was also a uniquely Irish venture. See J. P. O‟Grady, “The Irish Free State Passport and the 
Question of Citizenship, 1921-4” (Nov 1989) 26 (104) Irish Historical Studies 396 at 398.  
48 T.A. Smiddy was officially recognised as an ambassador to Washington in 1924.  See generally E.J. 
Phelan, “The Sovereignty of the Irish Free State” (Geneva: Review of Nations Publishing, 1927) at 35- 49.  
49 Lenihan, supra note 3 at 5. 
50 [1931] I.R. 215 [hereinafter Galway County Council]. 
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Prerogative and prerogative right can be relied upon by the Irish Free State, and is part 
of the law of the land”.51 This is the first case where such a declaration was made. To 
support this he cited Maritime Bank v. Receiver-General of New Brunswick,52 “an 
important decision of the Privy Council upon the law, practice, and constitutional usage 
in relation to Canada - where it was decided that prerogative right can be relied upon 
not only by the Dominion Government, but also by the Provincial Governments of 
Canada.”.53 
 
Walsh J. in Byrne criticised the use of Canadian precedent here: 
[i]n my view, the reference to the constitutional usage of Canada, in 
addition to being the basis of a concession, was used too generally in the 
context because it did not follow that, because in the law of Canada the 
Crown had the prerogative … the right necessarily existed also in the Irish 
Free State.54 
 
In the case of Re Irish Employers Mutual Insurance Association Limited55 Kingsmill Moore 
J. also considered the use of Canadian precedent. In regards to Article 2 of the Treaty he 
stated: 
[i]t seems to me that Article 2 was intended to impose on the new Free 
State those limitations on autonomy and restrictions of status at least until 
the law practice and constitutional usage of Canada was changed. But it was 
not intended to do more. 56 It did not purpose [sic] in any other way to 
restrict the autonomy or legislative power of Saorstat Eireann and it was 
quite competent for the new state either by its Constitution, or by 
subsequent enactment, or by its procedure and the forms it adopted, to 
regulate its own finances and control its own property in any way it 
wished.57 
 
                                                 
51 Ibid. at 232. 
52[1892] A.C. 437. 
53 Galway County Council, supra note 50 at 232.  
54 Ibid. at 270. 
55 [1955] I.R. 176 [hereinafter Re Irish Employers]. 
56 The limitations referred to are those in relation to powers of the Governor General, Appeal to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and restrictions on extra-territorial legislation; ibid. at 218. 
57 Ibid. at 218. 
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Kingsmill Moore J. went on to consider the differences in conception of the Irish and 
Canadian constitutions58 and then in relation to the case cited by Johnston J., he stated: 
“it does not seem to me to have any bearing on the position in Saorstát Éireann ... .”59 
In Galway County Council, Johnston J. also cited Re Bateman’s Trust in which it was held 
that “the Queen is as much the Queen of New South Wales as she is the Queen of 
England”.60 However, this was hardly a suitable precedent as, unlike the Irish situation, 
the Queen was recognised as the sovereign authority in New South Wales. Johnston J. 
failed to deal with the question of the actual survival or compatibility of the Royal 
Prerogative with the Irish Free State Constitution. 
 
A further point on the Canadian argument is that during the British discussions 
on the 1922 Constitution, Lloyd George commented to his cabinet that there was 
nothing in the Treaty which required the Irish 1922 Constitution to conform to the 
Canadian Constitution “so far as internal arrangements were concerned.” 61  The 
Prerogative can surely be defined as an internal arrangement.    
  
C. Specific Prerogative Powers in the 1922 Constitution 
  
Kevin Costello has argued that the Byrne decision is not sound because some 
forms of prerogative power were specifically provided for in the Irish Free State 
Constitution.62 He refers here to the power to grant titles in Article 5 and the appeal to 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Article 66. He attributes the inclusion of 
these provisions to “the anxiety of individual dominions to gain the maximum collection 
of executive prerogatives into their own hands.”63 Thus, the implication is that the Irish 
representatives wanted these provisions. However, this view completely ignores the 
legal reality of the constitutional discussions with the British, where the Irish were 
forced to accept these Articles in which the Crown, not the State or the people, was to 
                                                 
58 “When the events leading up to the passing of the Act of 1867 are compared with those which presided 
over the birth of the Saorstát Constitution it will be seen how unsafe it is to base any argument on a mere 
resemblance of phraseology”; ibid. at 222.  
59 Ibid. at 230. 
60 [1873] L.R. 15 Eq 355 [hereinafter Re Bateman’s Trust]. 
61 British National Archives Cabinet Minutes CAB 43/6 at 53. 
62 Costello, supra note 4. 
63 Ibid. at189.  
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exercise these rights. Furthermore, inclusion of prerogative provisions in the 1922 
Constitution was not an explicit recognition of the continuing power of Crown 
Prerogative in Ireland but rather a recognition that the Royal Prerogative had been, for 
the most part, discontinued but that certain aspects could be retained by the State.64 If 
these prerogatives were already understood to apply to the Irish Free State, then there 
would have been no need to include specific provisions enumerating this fact and if it 
was not only these prerogatives which survived why not include all the other 
prerogative powers also? 
 
D. Prerogative survived because it was carried over in its entirety by Articles in 
the 1922 Constitution  
 
In contrast to the previous argument which dealt with specific prerogative 
powers which were enumerated in the 1922 Constitution, this argument looks at two 
Articles which could possibly have carried over the Prerogative into independent 
Ireland.  
 
(i) Prerogative survived because of Article 51 
 
 Article 51 states: 
[t]he Executive Authority of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) is 
hereby declared to be vested in the King, and shall be exercisable, in 
accordance with the law, practice and constitutional usage governing the 
exercise of the Executive Authority in the case of the Dominion of Canada, 
by the Representative of the Crown ... . 
 
The case of Re Irish Employers concerned the winding up of a company.65 The 
Commissioners of Public Works claimed an amount of money as payable in priority to 
other creditors on the basis of inter alia the common law prerogative of priority 
accorded to Crown debts. In his enlightening High Court judgment, Kingsmill Moore J. 
undertook a detailed study of the history of that particular prerogative right and he 
                                                 
64 See statements of Minister O‟Higgins, infra notes 116-117 and accompanying text. 
65 Re Irish Employers, supra note 55. 
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came to the conclusion that it was inconsistent with the 1922 Constitution.66 However, 
in the course of his judgment, he references a distinction made by Blackstone in his 
definition of Prerogative: 
Blackstone divides the prerogatives of the king into two classes, the „direct‟ 
and the „incidental.‟ The direct prerogative he defines as „such positive 
substantial parts of the royal character and authority, as are rooted in and 
spring from the king's political person,‟ and such prerogatives would, in 
general have been preserved by the Saorstát Éireann constitution, which 
vested executive authority in the king, and would now (by Article 49 of our 
Constitution) belong to the People and be exercisable by the Government. 
The incidental prerogatives on the other hand are defined as „exceptions in 
favour of the crown, to those general rules that are established for the rest of 
the community,‟ and the right to priority payment of debts is given as an 
exam [sic] of such prerogatives.67 
 
While on the one hand, he resurrects an interesting and useful distinction, also he 
appears to provide a basis for the survival of the Prerogative in Article 51 of the 1922 
Constitution which declared that “[t]he Executive Authority of the Irish Free State 
(Saorstát Éireann) is hereby declared to be vested in the King…” The Supreme Court 
also took this view; despite the fact that the point is not dealt with as such in the 
                                                 
66 Following his historical consideration, Kingsmill Moore J. drew a number of conclusions, including the 
following:  
[t]he prerogative originated in a period when modern conceptions of the nature of sovereignty 
and government had not yet arisen. The structure of society was still feudal; property law was 
built on a feudal skeleton; loyalty was an essentially personal matter; the king was looked on 
more as a feudal overlord than as the embodiment of national power and aspiration; and the royal 
revenues, feudal by nature, were regarded as the king's personal possession, which could be spent 
by him according to his personal desires and without restriction by ministerial or parliamentary 
interference. 
Re Irish Employers, ibid. at 215. This led him to accept the proposition of Gavan Duffy J. in Irish Aero Club 
[1939] I.R. 204, see infra note 83, that “[t]he common law prerogative of prior payment of his debts 
belonged to the king, not because he was the supreme executive authority, but because of the personal 
pre-eminence over all subjects which attached to him at common law, on the principle expressed in the 
phrase detur digniori.”  Ibid. at 199.  
67 Ibid. at 199. Holdsworth also mentions this divide in the prerogative. He explains that the incidental 
prerogatives came into being in the mediaeval period when “the King was regarded quite as much as a 
superior feudal lord with special privileges as a ruler entrusted with the executive powers of the state”, 
ibid. Whereas, the direct prerogative, was a product of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, 
when the royal lawyers created for the king “a politic capacity and emphasised his powers in such a way 
that, through his prerogative he was able to act as the executive of a modern State”; W. Holdsworth, 
History of English Law, 3rd Ed. (London: Methuen, 1923) vol. 3, at 459. The same distinction is also 
referred to elsewhere using different terms; Bradely and Ewing refer to the ordinary and 
extraordinary/absolute prerogatives. “[t]he ordinary prerogative meant those royal functions which 
could only be exercised in defined ways and involved no element of royal discretion … By contrast, the 
absolute or extraordinary prerogative meant those powers which the King could exercise in his 
discretion”; A.W. Bradley & K.D. Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 13th Ed. (Harlow: 
Longman, 2007) at 246.  
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Supreme Court, the judgment of Kingsmill Moore J. is stated to be correct and 
Murnaghan J. makes the following comment: “[i]n my opinion there is no room [in the 
Irish Constitution] for that part of the prerogative which gave Crown debts priority of 
demand.”68 
 
However, the reasoning based on Article 51 is not sound because as early as 
1927 it had been emphatically affirmed that the Crown was nothing but a fiction in the 
Irish Free State.  Kennedy C.J. in Re Reade stated: “[t]he Crown is in each Dominion 
the permanent symbol of executive government, but the actual government is in fact 
and in constitutional reality in the hands of the national ministers responsible to, and 
changeable at the will of, the national parliament.”69 Kennedy‟s statement on the purely 
symbolic position of the Crown was not revolutionary because it was obvious in Ireland 
at the time. Kevin Costello has shown how during the discussions on the 1922 
Constitution with the British “the Crown was degraded to a purely symbolic position.”70 
And he has correctly noted how: “[t]he Crown was removed from the sphere of 
administration, and from the exercise of those common law executive powers known in 
those jurisdictions which adopt the English constitutional model as prerogatives.”71 It is 
obvious that the Crown was never more than a symbol in the Irish Free State. It 
therefore does not make sense to argue that Article 51 brought the Prerogative into the 
Irish Free State because to do so would imply that the King had a real role in the Irish 
Free State.  
 
(ii) Prerogative survived because of Article 73 
 
 Article 73 provided: 
[s]ubject to this Constitution and to the extent to which they are not 
inconsistent therewith, the laws in force in the Irish Free State (Saorstát 
                                                 
68 Re Irish Employers, supra note 55 at 241.  
69 [1927] I.R. 31 at 50. 
70 Kennedy, who was Attorney General at the time, ensured there was to be no semblance of continuance 
in terms of monarchical rule in Ireland and he had deleted a sentence, which the British were insisting 
upon,  which stated that the executive power of the Irish Free State was declared to “continue to be vested 
in the King”. See Costello, supra note 4 at 172-179.  
71 Ibid. at 179. He also notes that evidence extracted from law reports, from governmental legal opinions, 
and from administrative practice confirms the construction of Article 51 whereby the Crown is merely a 
symbol.  
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Éireann) at the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution shall 
continue to be of full force and effect until the same or any of them shall 
have been repealed or amended by enactment of the Oireachtas. 
 
Cooper v. Attorney General & Ors involved the right of fishing in tidal waters where a 
British statute had created a private fishery in 1837.72  It was argued that the 
prerogative, whereby the right of fishing in tidal waters was reserved for the Crown, 
should apply. Johnston J. found for the plaintiff but significantly, on the prerogative 
point itself, he stated: “[i]t is true, no doubt, that the prerogative rights of the Crown 
were carried over as part of the law of the Irish Free State by Article 73 of the 
Constitution.”73  Again, he relied on Re Bateman’s Trust74 as support for this contention 
which, as we have seen,75 was not suitable authority.  
 
Article 73 was also cited as the basis for prerogative power in Ireland in the case 
of Cork County Council & Burke v. Commissioners of Public Works.76 The case involved the 
question of whether the State was liable for rates. Again, it involved a consideration of 
whether the State was bound by statute or whether, like the Crown, it was immune 
because of Prerogative. The Supreme Court was asked to answer three questions. 
Among them was the following: “[a]re the defendants, the Commissioners of Public 
Works in Éire, entitled to enjoy the like immunity from liability for rates as was 
                                                 
72 [1935] I.R. 425 [hereinafter Cooper]. The plaintiff was heir to the private fishery and brought the case 
to establish legal title over the special defendants who had been fishing in the area on the basis that “the 
right of fishing in the tidal waters was vested in the Crown in trust for the public generally”. Johnston J. 
considered the argument of the Attorney General whereby the right of fishing in the tidal waters “was 
vested in the British Crown in trust for the public generally and that the said British statute did not affect 
the prerogative of the Crown or detract from the right of fishing in the said tidal waters enjoyed by the 
public.” Ibid. at 432. Basically, the argument put forward, which was never going to succeed, was that the 
prerogative right trumped the statutorily created right. Johnston J. felt that the plea was ingenious but 
that it did not represent the law: “[t]he fallacy, in my opinion, is to be found in the allegation that the 
public's right to fish in tidal waters „was vested in the British Crown in trust for the public generally.‟ 
Ibid. at 440. He cited the cases of Mersey Docks & Harbour Board v. Cameron 11 H.L.C. 443 and Clyde 
Navigation Trustees v. Adamson, 4 Macq. 931 and stated that: 
[t]he matter was settled as early as the time of Coke in the  Case of Non Obstante, where it was 
laid down that „no Act of Parliament can bind the King from any prerogative which is sole and 
inseparable to his person, but he may dispense with it by a non obstante ... But in things which are 
not incident solely and inseparably to the person of the King, but belong to every subject and 
may be severed, there an Act of Parliament may absolutely bind the King. 
Ibid. at 441.  
73 Cooper, ibid. at 440. 
74  Re Bateman’s Trust, supra note 60. 
75 See supra at 11-12.  
76 [1945] I.R. 561 [hereinafter Cork County Council]. 
2010 The Prerogative and its Survival in Ireland 17 
 
 
formerly claimed and enjoyed by the Crown prior to the Constitution of the Irish Free 
State?” However, Murnaghan J. stated that it was not necessary to deal with this 
question:  
[i]t has, however, become unnecessary to give any answer to the general 
question as propounded because the plaintiffs have admitted that, having 
regard to the history of the lands with which the case is concerned, the 
Minister for Finance is entitled to the same prerogative as was, prior to 
1921, enjoyed by the Crown.77 
 
O‟Byrne J. stated that although “it was conceded by counsel that this general question 
was propounded in terms too wide to admit of a categorical answer ... ,”78 he felt that he 
should deal with the point anyway: 
[w]hen the Irish Free State was established, a Constitution was enacted 
which provided for the creation of a Legislature consisting of the King and 
two Houses (Art. 12), and further provided that the executive authority was 
vested in the King and exercisable in the manner thereby provided (Art. 51). 
Article 73 provided that, subject to the Constitution and to the extent to 
which they were not inconsistent therewith, the laws in force in the Irish 
Free State, at the date of the coming into operation of the Constitution, 
should continue to be of full force and effect until the same or any of them 
should have been repealed or amended by enactment of the Legislature 
thereby established. In view of these provisions I can see no reason for 
holding that the prerogative, with which I am dealing, was not transferred 
to the Irish Free State. It was part of the common law, which was applied to 
the Irish Free State by Art. 73.79 
 
While it looks like O‟Byrne J. was playing it safe in referencing both Article 51 
and Article 73, he seems to have eventually decided that it was Article 73 which 
brought the Prerogative into the new State. Significantly too, he went on to rationalise 
the prerogative in question in such a way that it would not be inconsistent with the 
1922 Constitution. He cited the American case of United States v. Hoar in which Story J. 
held as follows: 
[w]e find, accordingly, in our own State the doctrine is well settled that no 
laches can be imputed to the Government and against it no time runs, so as 
to bar its rights. So that it is clear that the Statutes of Limitations pleaded in 
this case would be no bar to a suit brought to enforce any right of the State 
in its own Courts. 
                                                 
77 Ibid. at 571. 
78 Cork County Council, supra note 76 at 576. O‟Byrne was a member of the 1922 Constitution Committee. 
79 Ibid. at 578.  
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Where the Government is not expressly, or by necessary implication 
included, it ought to be clear from the nature of the mischiefs to be redressed 
or the language used that the Government itself was in contemplation of the 
Legislature before a Court of law would be authorised to put such an 
interpretation upon any statute. In general, Acts of the Legislature are 
meant to regulate and direct the acts and rights of citizens and in most cases 
the reasoning applicable to them applied with very different and often 
contrary force to the Government itself. 
It appears to me, therefore, to be a safe rule, founded in the principles of 
the Common Law, that the general words of a statute ought not to include 
the Government, or affect its rights, unless that construction be clear and 
indisputable upon the text of the Act.80 
 
That the right could be recognised in a country with a republican constitution was 
significant. Black J, in the same case, followed the reasoning of O‟Byrne J. saying:  
[m]uch time was devoted to discussing the true nature of this right and to 
combating the supposition that so far as it still exists, it is inseparable from 
the institution of kingship. If that were so, one would not expect to find such 
a right recognised for over a century by the Courts of the United States of 
America where the institution of kingship has no existence.81 
 
Thus, both judges wished to draw a distinction,82 which was later emphasised by Kelly, 
who explained it as: 
 [b]etween those aspects of the royal prerogative which appeared to be 
appendages of a royal personality, like the old right of prior payment from 
an insolvent estate which Gavan Duffy J. had declared dead as long ago as 
1938,83 and other aspects, such as the implicit exemption of the State from 
the burdens imposed by its own statutes which could be presented as „broad-
based upon the public interest‟.84 
 
Basically, the argument was that the State could have retained aspects of the 
Prerogative which could be rationalised in terms of public interest and so could have 
been carried over by Article 73 as they would not conflict with the 1922 Constitution. 
Interestingly, the rationalisation which was drawn upon in this case is not unlike the 
                                                 
80 (1821) 2 Mason 311 at 577 [hereinafter Hoar]. 
81 Ibid. at 587. 
82 See infra at 24.  
83 The case which Kelly refers to here, we can presume, is Re Irish Aero Club [1939] I.R. 204, in which it 
had been claimed that State was entitled to enjoy the prerogative which accorded to the British Crown a 
right to payment in full in priority to its subjects. However, during the course of the hearing this claim 
was abandoned. Gavan Duffy J.  responded as follows: “[v]ery properly, if I may say so, for such a claim 
would be hard to reconcile with the Constitution.” Ibid. at 209. 
84 Kelly, supra note 5 at 7.  
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distinction resurrected by Kingsmill Moore J. in Re Mutual in relation to direct and 
incidental prerogatives.85 
 
The idea of a distinction or rationalisation broadly based on public interest can 
be traced back further. In Leen v. President of the Executive Council & Ors the court had to 
consider the existence of the prerogative right of executive privilege in relation to the 
disclosure of documents. 86 Gavan Duffy QC, who was counsel for the plaintiff, argued 
against the existence of Prerogative in the Irish 1922 Constitution: “[w]e submit that 
anything savouring of Prerogative was done away with by the Preamble to the 
Constitution and by Article 2 thereof; and the main case made by the defendants was 
hardly distinguishable from Prerogative.”87 However, Meredith J. ruled against him. He 
held that executive privilege existed as a prerogative, not to be claimed by the Crown 
but by the State on the basis of public interest: 
[i]f the defendants are entitled to the privilege that the Crown would have, 
I cannot go behind this objection. It is contended, however, by the plaintiff 
that the privilege can only be claimed by the Crown as such. I can find 
nothing, however, in the authorities on this privilege in respect of discovery 
to suggest that the rule of law which has always been in force, and which has 
to be administered as heretofore under the Constitution of the Irish Free 
State, is dependent upon the magic of any particular nomenclature. On the 
contrary, it appears to me to be broadbased upon the public interest, and in this 
connection the remarks of Rigby L.J. in Attorney-General v. Newcastle-upon-
Tyne Corporation: “I may say that in these days the prerogative of the Crown 
is about equivalent to the rights of the public,” cited by Mr. Costello, are 
apposite.88 
 
Interestingly, in the more modern case of Murphy v. Dublin Corporation which also 
concerned executive privilege against the disclosure of official documents, Walsh J. 
decided the case using the same reasoning as Meredith J.89 Notably, there is no 
reference to Prerogative in that case. 
 
 
                                                 
85 Supra at 13-15. For more discussion see infra at 24 et seq.  
86 [1926] I.R. 456. 
87 Ibid. at 461. 
88 Ibid. at 463 [emphasis added]. 
89 [1972] I.R. 215. It was decided in this case that the courts (as opposed to the Minister) can decide 
whether to preserve the confidential nature of official documents in the public interest.  
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E. Why would Article 49 have been included in the 1937 Constitution? 
 
Lenihan argues that: “[t]he People would hardly have bothered to insert Article 
4990 into the 1937 Constitution if they did not believe that prerogative rights and 
powers had survived the enactment of the 1922 Constitution and that, therefore, if needs 
be, the Crown was the personification of Saorstát Éireann.”91 Kelly also put forward a 
similar argument.92  While they may have a point about the purpose of Article 49, it is 
submitted that the architects of the 1937 Constitution would never have intended an 
interpretation whereby the Crown would be the personification of the State. In fact they 
went to great pains to underline the fact that it was the people who were sovereign. As 
argued below, it is more probable that Article 49 was intended merely as a carry-over 
Article and it is certainly ludicrous to suggest, by a mere implication, that it was 
intended  to cover something which is inconsistent with the rest of the 1937 
Constitution.  
 
Kevin Costello has also expressed the view that the interpretations of Article 49 
by Lenihan and Kelly are “defective”: 
[t]hey rest on the following propositions (i) that the royal prerogatives are 
the administrative powers of the Crown; (ii) that in the Irish Free State 
executive power was vested in the Crown; (iii) that it is, accordingly correct 
to speak of a royal prerogative operating in the Irish Free State, and (iv) that 
                                                 
90 Article 49 provides: 
[a]ll powers, functions, rights and prerogatives whatsoever exercisable in or in respect of 
Saorstát Éireann immediately before the 11th day of December, 1936, whether in virtue of the 
Constitution then in force or otherwise, by the authority in which the executive power of 
Saorstát Éireann was then vested are hereby declared to belong to the people. 
2.    It is hereby enacted that, save to the extent to which provision is made by this Constitution 
or may hereafter be made by law for the exercise of any such power, function, right or 
prerogative by any of the organs established by this Constitution, the said powers, functions, 
rights and prerogatives shall not be exercised or be capable of being exercised in or in respect of 
the State save only by or on the authority of the Government. 
3.    The Government shall be the successors of the Government of Saorstát Éireann as regards 
all property, assets, rights and liabilities. 
91 Lenihan, supra note 3 at 3. 
92 Kelly states: 
I cannot see what „prerogatives‟, specifically mentioned in Article 49.1, can have been on the 
mind of the drafters the Dáil, or the People, in promoting, approving, and enacting this Article, 
except those which on the Byrne plus Webb hypotheses, had never existed at all in the Irish Free 
State. On the other hand, if we assume that Article 49.1 is not simply beating on the air and that 
there was something for it to operate on, it follows that some elements of Royal prerogative did 
indeed continue to exist in that State. 
Kelly, supra note 5 at 10. 
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it is this prerogative which is referred to in Article 49. The problem is that 
they misconceive the theoretical basis of executive power in the Irish Free 
State. All of the evidence shows that constitutional opinion in the Irish Free 
State rejected the notion that executive authority was located in the 
Crown.93 
 
In dealing with this argument, Costello focused on proposition (ii) and although Article 
51 states that executive authority was vested in the King, we know that this was simply 
a constitutional fiction.94 So because proposition (ii) is wrong, the other propositions 
fall. The King was simply a nominal head with some ceremonial functions.  He goes on 
to suggest that the “powers, functions, rights and prerogatives” referred to in Article 49 
could only have meant the symbolic type of functions exercisable by the King. Costello 
further demonstrates that Article 49 could not have meant any powers exercised by the 
King at common law because the King was not actually competent in that area.95  
 
Why then was Article 49 included in the 1937 Constitution? It is submitted that 
its inclusion was intended to be an aid to transition, not unlike Article 80 of the 1922 
Constitution,96 and to provide the means of “enabling the administration to be carried 
on and the various powers under existing laws to be exercised in all their fullness.”97 In 






                                                 
93 Costello, supra note 4 at 167. 
94 See supra at 13-15.  
95 Costello, supra note  4 at 179, 180. For an in-depth analysis of the basis of executive power in the Irish 
Free State see 167-179.  
96 Article 80 states: 
[a]s respects departmental property, assets, rights and liabilities, the Government of the Irish 
Free State (Saorstát Éireann) shall be regarded as the successors of the Provisional Government, 
and to the extent to which functions of the department of the British Government become 
functions of the Government of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann), as the successors of such 
department of the British Government. 
97 See Observations from the Department of Finance in D. Keogh & A. McCarthy, The Making of the Irish 
Constitution 1937 (Cork: Mercier Press, 2007) at 128. Unfortunately this is simply a sentence from the 
observations of the Department of Finance on the draft 1937 Constitution and there is no further 
discussion on the point.  
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IV – Two Categories of Prerogative: A Synthesis 
 
Having considered the various arguments it is clear that arguments B, C and E 
do not stand up, nor does the idea of Article 51 bringing over Prerogative in D. In 
relation to argument A, a historical analysis has shown that the position is not clear-cut. 
Kelly claimed that lawyers in the 1920s believed Prerogative had survived but Kohn, 
writing in the 1920s, believed it had not. The cases certainly do not illuminate the 
matter; in all of the older case law considered, it was only some particular aspect of the 
Prerogative which was under discussion and each of them assumed the actual survival 
or compatibility of the Royal Prerogative with the 1922 Constitution. In addition, many 
of the earlier cases were all decided by Johnston J. who did not actually consider the 
compatibility of the Prerogative with the 1922 Constitution but obviously believed 
Prerogative had survived. However, it seems Gavan Duffy J. held a different view.98  So 
how can these views be reconciled? It is possible that a misunderstanding exists in 
relation to Prerogative survival in Ireland but perhaps this can be explained by a 
distinction which has been drawn in a number of cases and which we shall now examine.  
 
Thus far, it seems we can conclude that Article 73 brought the Prerogative into 
the Irish Free State but only prerogatives of a particular type were admitted. However, 
we have to consider whether this possibility is contradicted in Byrne. In Byrne, Walsh J. 
confronted the argument that the Irish Free State inherited Prerogative by virtue of 
Article 73 and concluded: 
 [a]ll royal prerogatives to be found in the common law of England and in 
the common law of Ireland prior to the enactment of the Constitution of 
Saorstát Éireann, 1922, ceased to be part of the law of Saorstát Éireann 
because they were based on concepts expressly repudiated by Article 2 of 
that Constitution and, therefore, were inconsistent with the provisions of 
that Constitution and were not carried over by Article 73.99   
 
                                                 
98 In the High Court case of Irish Land Commission v. Ruane, [1938] I.R. 148, Gavan Duffy J.  refused to 
concede that prerogative could be relied upon. During legal argument, he repeatedly challenged counsel 
for the respondent, who claimed the prerogative of state exemption from statutes, and while Johnston J. 
took it for granted that the prerogative existed and focused his judgment on whether it was available to 
the respondent, Gavan Duffy J.  refused to deal with the prerogative point and decided the case on 
statutory grounds.  Also see supra note 83 and accompanying text.  
99 Byrne, supra note 1 at 274. 
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Walsh J. also took a closer look at the Cork County Council100 case. First, he quoted the 
following sentence from the judgment of Story J. in Hoar which, 101 in his judgment on 
the Cork County Council case, O‟Byrne J. had omitted: “[b]ut, independently of any 
doctrine founded on the notion of Prerogative, the same construction of statutes of this 
sort ought to prevail, founded upon the legislative intention.”102 Walsh J. termed this a 
“vital sentence because it rationalises the principle expressed by Story J.”103 He also 
quoted a further sentence omitted by O‟Byrne J.: “[a]nd though this is sometimes called 
a prerogative right, it is in fact nothing more than a reservation, or exception, 
introduced for the public benefit, and equally applicable to all governments.”104 
However, Walsh J. then appears to endorse the rationalisation: 
 [i]n so far as the State may be exempted from the provisions of a statute, it 
may possibly be capable of being rationalised on the basis on which it was 
done in United States v. Hoar, and which was adopted by O‟Byrne J. as one of 
his reasons; but it is not necessary to decide that matter in this case as we 
are not concerned with the construction of a statute or with the question of 
whether or not the State is bound by the restrictive provisions of some 
statute.105 
 
He also says later: 
 [i]n my view, for the reasons I have already stated, no such immunity was 
available in Saorstát Éireann by virtue of any inherent quality in the royal 
person. If immunity from suit could have been claimed for the State, it could 
only have been on the basis of a rationalisation such as that enunciated in 
United States v. Hoar and adopted by O‟Byrne J. in Cork County Council v. 
Commissioners of Public Works; that immunity, if it existed, would have been 
enjoyed by Saorstát Éireann and not by the King.106 
 
But as Kelly has written, such a rationalisation was missing in the Byrne case itself. 
However, Kelly also wrote that “[f]or Walsh J., accordingly, the test whether this or 
that aspect of the Prerogative has survived must depend on its rationale, if it can be 
rationalised in terms which a republican Constitution can accommodate, it may be relied 
                                                 
100 Supra note 76. 
101 Hoar, supra note 80. 
102 Byrne, supra note 1 at 276. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. at 278. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. at 279. 
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on.”107 Could this mean that, contrary to what has previously been thought, Walsh J. 
had not ruled out Prerogative finally and completely? 
 
The existence of this distinction or rationalisation drawn by O‟Byrne J, in Cork 
County Council108 and later advocated by Kelly109 seems to solve a lot of problems. It 
meets the argument articulated by Gwynn Morgan, 110 and significantly accords with 
the views enunciated in Geoghegan.111 In that case, Murphy J. had held the following 
(obiter) in the High Court:  
[i]t seems to me that the laws carried forward by Article 73 of the 
Constitution of Saorstát Éireann, 1922, and Article 50 of the Constitution of 
Ireland, 1937, comprise the full range of laws whether customary or 
statutory and however they have been made or evolved, subject only to their 
not being inconsistent with either Constitution. I see no reason in principle 
why a law enacted in Great Britain in medieval times by the Monarch 
himself in pursuance of the legislative powers which (as well as judicial and 
executive powers) vested in him not merely as a theoretical concept but as a 
practical reality could not have passed into the laws of the Irish Free State. 
The filtering process provided by Article 73 of the Constitution of Saorstát Éireann, 
1922 (like the comparable provision in the Constitution of Ireland, 1937), related to 
the content of the law and not its source.112 
 
In this passage, Murphy J. first accepted the argument that Article 73 carried over 
prerogative powers into independent Ireland. Secondly, in the last sentence (italicised in 
the quotation) he provides a distinction which sustains that of O‟Byrne J, Kingsmill 
Moore J. and Kelly. This view was subsequently endorsed in the Supreme Court by 
O‟Flaherty J, who quoted the above passage by Murphy J. and then stated “I accept and 
endorse that finding.”113 
  
                                                 
107 J.M. Kelly, The Irish Constitution, 2nd ed. (Dublin: Jurist, 1984) at 699. Strangely, this quote does not 
seem to appear in the newer versions of Kelly.  
108 Supra note 76. 
109 Kelly, supra note 5. 
110 Professor David Gwynn Morgan stated that “even without the extirpation of the prerogative carried 
out in Byrne, no prerogative could exist if it conflicted with the Constitution; that surely is sufficient of 
itself”. See D.G. Morgan, “Constitutional Interpretation: Three Cautionary Tales” (1988) 10 D.U.L.J. 24 
at 35. 
111 Geoghegan, supra note 6. This case related to an Institute which was established by prerogative power 
prior to 1922 and the question raised was whether this and other such bodies had survived the enactment 
of the 1922 Constitution. It was held that although the Royal prerogative had not survived, there was no 
reason that such bodies could not have continued to exist under the 1922 Constitution. 
112  Ibid. at 95 [emphasis added].  
113 Ibid. at 118. 
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 Thus, it is possible to argue that some parts of the Prerogative could have 
survived under Article 73, with the use of a distinction, either O‟Byrne‟s, which was 
essentially that of Blackstone: the direct versus the incidental prerogatives,114 or 
Murphy J.‟s distinction in Geoghegan based on the source versus content of the 
Prerogative. This would mean that the parts of Prerogative which were inconsistent 
with the 1922 Constitution were not carried over but others could have been as long as 
they could be rationalised. In other words, the feudal prerogative powers which were 
created because the “personal pre-eminence” of the King would not have survived the 
creation of the Irish Free State but those that are based on public interest could have. 
This would also make sense of the existence of contradictory opinions. 
 
 The idea that certain prerogative powers survived is supported by speeches of 
deputies during the Dáil debates on the Constitution of 1922 where they recognised 
that for the most part the Prerogative had died out but there were a few remnants left. 
In speaking on the provision regarding the right to grant titles of honour,115 the 
Minister for Home Affairs, Kevin O‟Higgins, acknowledged that this was “one of the 
few remaining prerogatives of the Crown.”116  Unfortunately, he did not elaborate on 
this. However, during the controversy regarding appeals to the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council, O‟Higgins declared in the Dáil: “[a]s a Government, we are opposed 
to this remnant of the Sovereign‟s Prerogative. We think it ought to be allowed lapse by 
non-user, just as other prerogatives have lapsed.”117 This suggests that certain 
prerogative powers had survived but had subsequently died out by non-use. O‟Higgins, 
who was a lawyer, failed to elaborate on the point and did not mention which 
prerogatives had lapsed but it is clear that he believed that, for the most part, 
Prerogative had been extinguished but that some elements remained. 
 
But does this contradict Kohn‟s view that there was no Prerogative in the Irish 
Free State? It is submitted that Kohn believed that Prerogative was extinct because the 
idea of Prerogative was not consistent with the basis of the new State. However, if the 
                                                 
114 See supra  note 67 and accompanying text. 
115 Article 5 of the Irish Free State Constitution. 
116 1 Dáil Deb. col 680 (25 September 1922). 
117 14 Dáil Deb. col 331 (3 February 1926); the second reading of the Land Bill 1926. 
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State had chosen to retain certain aspects, the content of which did not conflict with the 
1922 Constitution, on the basis of public interest, perhaps Kohn would have refined his 
general statement.  So it seems that the Prerogative, to a certain extent, may have 
survived the enactment of the Irish Free State but not in the same manner as that 
contended by recent academics. It is submitted that the Prerogative cannot be taken as a 
single entity and while certain rights of Prerogative were recognised to have had died 
out in 1922, it may have suited the Irish Government to retain some of them as long as 
they were not inconsistent with the republican leitmotif.  
 
V – Conclusion: “Positively Useful Prerogative”? 
 
 Although the British may have forced certain prerogative powers upon the 
Irish,118 the Irish Government might also have chosen to retain certain aspects of the 
former prerogative powers later, as despite the antiquarian nature of the powers and 
their dubious heritage, the Prerogative does contain some useful powers for the 
government of a modern state. While it may be of less importance in Ireland now, since 
the 1937 Constitution and statute law cover most of the former prerogative powers, 
there are still areas which are not covered by any form of legislation and where the 
Prerogative could prove useful. The situation which occurred in the Webb case is an 
obvious example in that the case would have been much simpler had Treasure Trove 
been accepted.119 Other examples of useful prerogative powers include the power to 
keep the peace, the prerogative power which comes into play in the event of a grave 
national emergency, and includes the power to enter upon, take and destroy private 
property. 120 While the latter power might seem unlikely ever to be used in Ireland, in 
the event of a terrorist attack or any other such national emergency, were the 
                                                 
118 The specific prerogative powers in the Constitution such as the right to grant titles of honour in 
Article 5 and the Appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Article 64. 
119 Had the prerogative power of Treasure Trove been recognised in this case, the very awkward 
reasoning by the Supreme Court, in an attempt to secure the find for the State, could have been avoided. 
After the dust had settled, it was considered necessary to bring in the National Monuments Act 1994.  
120 This prerogative was drawn upon when oil fields in Burma were destroyed by the UK during the 
Second World War in order to prevent the plantations from falling into the hands of the advancing 
Japanese army. The act of sabotage later became the subject of a court case in relation to compensation 
payable. See Burmah Oil Company Ltd. v. Lord Advocate [1965] A.C. 75. It was held in the case that the 
British Government had to pay compensation notwithstanding the prerogative power. Obviously, the 
situation would have been much more serious for the British Government had they destroyed the 
property without the existence of the prerogative power. 
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Oireachtas unable to meet in order to pass legislation, there would exist no such power 
in Ireland.121  
 
The issue has arisen in the UK recently as part of a review which was carried out 
into the use of prerogative powers.122 The review carried out a useful survey of crown 
prerogative powers, looking in detail at the use of the powers, and provided a 
consolidated list for the first time.123 The review concluded that the continued use of 
prerogative powers involved “no significant negative effects.”124 Furthermore it was 
concluded that:  “[i]n many cases it is positively useful. Legislation to replace some of 
them could itself give rise to new risks: of unnecessary incursions into civil liberties on 
the one hand, or of dangerously weakening the state‟s ability to respond to unforeseen 
circumstances on the other.”125  
 
The power to act in an emergency was one of the powers considered in the 
review and despite the fact that the UK has passed the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (2004 
Act), which provides a comprehensive system for dealing with grave emergencies, the 
review deduced that there were still areas not covered by the 2004 Act and areas where 
the 2004 Act could be insufficient: “[a]lthough it seems likely that the Civil 
Contingencies Act 2004 has covered much of the „field‟ of the emergency prerogative 
powers, it appears that important aspects remain for use in cases of particular urgency 
or disruption where the statute may not operate effectively.”126 The 2004 Act was passed 
in the UK as a response to a series of crises; the fuel protests and mass flooding in the 
year 2000 and the outbreak of Foot and Mouth disease in 2001. According to the UK 
                                                 
121 The only existing powers which come close relate to the seizure of property in relation to the 
commission of an offence, e.g. section 7 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006. Of course the compulsory 
purchase procedure is also available but this is a time consuming process. Thus, it is clear that Ireland 
does not have any emergency powers framework outside of the criminal law arena. 
122 This was carried out as part of the Governance of Britain programme.  
123 Ministry of Justice, Review of the Executive Royal Prerogative Powers: Final Report  (London: HMSO,  
2009) <http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/docs/royal-prerogative.pdf>  (date accessed: 10 December 
2009) [hereinafter Ministry of Justice].  
124 It was noted that some of the prerogative powers were obsolete, such as the right to sturgeon and wild 
swans. However, it was felt that they had lapsed by non-use and it would only constitute a waste of 
parliamentary time to remove those older, now useless, prerogative powers. 
125 Ministry of Justice, supra note 123 at 29. Another prerogative power which could prove useful is the 
power to keep the peace where no emergency exists. See ibid. at 26.  
126 The prerogative is most useful in a situation where there is insufficient time to put statutory 
provisions into place, ibid. at 21.  
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Cabinet Office, the 2004 Act “delivers a single framework for civil protection in the 
United Kingdom capable of meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century.”127 The 
2004 Act is divided into two parts; Part 1 establishes “a clear set of roles and 
responsibilities for those involved in emergency preparation and response at the local 
level” and Part 2 “allows for the making of temporary special legislation (emergency 
regulations) to help deal with the most serious of emergencies.”128 
 
This is significant here, particularly in view of the fact that Ireland does not even 
have an equivalent to the UK 2004 Act. The legislative framework in the UK allows for 
the means of preparation for emergencies.129 The prerogative then covers anything else 
which is necessary in an emergency. This is quite a wide-ranging power. In Ireland at 
present, we have none of these powers. The only emergency legislation which exists in 
Ireland was drawn up in response to IRA activities and criminal gangs.130 This 
constitutes a moderately serious gap in our legal system, which is likely to become more 
serious in the future. If the Swine Flu situation escalated to a national emergency 
tomorrow, the Irish Government would have very little in the way of emergency 
powers available to it. But this is only one example, it is possible that these powers 
could become necessary, in the event of a terrorist attack, a nuclear disaster, another 
major war, outbreak of a deadly virus, even for protection against the effects of global 
warming in terms of building defences against flooding and storms or any form of 
national emergency. The prerogative power is so wide that it could cover any of these 
emergencies without the need for legislation. If the UK government has decided that 
the exercise of prerogative powers is “positively useful”, even where the 2004 Act has 
been provided, it would suggest that it could be even more beneficial here, where we 
have not provided for these sorts of contingencies. 
 
 
                                                 
127 See <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/ccact.aspx> (date accessed: 10 
December 2009). 
128 Ibid.  
129 It also makes it easier to repeal any debilitating legislation; ibid.  
130 The Offences Against the State Acts 1939, 1972, 1985 and 1998. Also the Criminal Justice Acts. Previously, 
Emergency Powers Acts were passed; the 1939 Act was amended and the state of emergency lasted until 
1976, when it was replaced by the Emergency Powers Act 1976. This Act expired in 1995.  
